We study the problem of selling n items to a number of buyers with additive valuation functions. We consider the items to be correlated, i.e., desirabilities of buyers for the items are not drawn independently. Ideally, the goal is to design a mechanism to maximize the revenue. However, it has been shown that the optimum-revenue mechanism might be very complicated and as a result inapplicable to real-world auctions. Therefore, our focus is on designing a simple mechanism that gets a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. This problem was posed by Babaioff et al. in paper "A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer" (FOCS 2014) as an open question. In their paper they show a constant approximation of the optimal revenue can be achieved by either selling the items separately or as a whole bundle in the independent setting. We show a similar result for the correlated setting when the desirabilities of buyers are drawn from a common-base correlation. It is worth mentioning that the core decomposition lemma which is mainly the heart of the proofs for efficiency of the mechanisms does not hold for correlated settings. Therefore we proposed a modified version of this lemma which plays a key role in proving bounds on the approximation of the mechanism. In addition, we introduce a generalized form of correlation for items and show the same mechanism can achieve an approximation of the optimal revenue in that setting.
Introduction
Suppose an auctioneer wants to sell n items to a number of buyers. Each buyer's value for a particular item comes from a known distribution, and the buyers' values are assumed to be additive (i.e., value of a set of items for a buyer is equal to the summation of the values of the items in the set). Buyers are considered to be strategic, that is, each buyer is trying maximize v(S) − p(S) where S is the set of purchased items, v(S) is the value of these items to the buyer and p(S) is the price of the set. Knowing that the valuation of buyer i for item j is drawn from a given distribution D i,j , what is the revenue-optimal mechanism for the auctioneer to sell the items? Myerson [18] solves the problem for a very simple case where we only have a single item and one buyer. He shows that in this special case the optimal mechanism is to set a fixed reserved price for the item. Despite simplicity of the optimal mechanism for selling a single item, this problem becomes quite complicated when it comes to selling two items even when we have only one buyer in particular. Hart and Reny [13] show an optimal mechanism for selling two independent items is much more subtle, and may involve randomization.
Though there are several attempts to characterize the properties for an optimal mechanism of an auction, most approaches seem to be too complex and as a result impractical for real-world auctions [2, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 9, 12, 14] . Therefore, a new line of investigation is to design simple mechanisms that are approximately optimal. In a recent work of Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinberg [3] (FOCS 2014), it is shown that we can achieve a constant-factor approximation of the optimal revenue by selling items either separately or as a whole bundle in the independent setting. However, they leave the following important open problem in their paper:
• "Open Problem 3. Is there a simple, approximately optimal mechanism for a single additive buyer whose value for n items is sampled from a common base-value distribution? What about other models of limited correlation?"
Note that the idea of having a common base-value correlation has been used by Chawla, Malec, and Sivan [10] when they study mechanism design for selling multiple items in a unit-demand setting and prove to be fruitful. In this work we study the problem for the case of correlated valuation functions and answer the above open problem. In addition we also introduce a generalized form of correlation between items. Suppose you have a set of items and want to sell them to a single buyer. The buyer has a set of features in his mind and considers a value for each feature which is randomly drawn from a known distribution. Furthermore, he formulates the desirability for each item as a linear combination of the values of the features. More precisely, each buyer has l distributions F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F l and an l ×n matrix M (which is used for determining the valuation of items based on the valuation of features) such that the value of feature i (which is denoted by f i ) is drawn from F i and the value of item j is calculated by
This framework is a good model for studying correlated valuation functions especially when each item has different features and the buyer is setting values for each item based on the quality of that items in each feature. Note that every common base-value distribution is a special case of this general correlation model where we have n + 1 features F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F n , B and the value of item i is computed as v i + b where v i is drawn from F i and b which is equal for all items is drawn from the constant distribution B .
Related Work
As mentioned earlier, the problem originates from the seminal work of Myerson [18] in 1981 which characterizes a revenue-optimal mechanism for selling a single item to a single buyer. This result was important in the sense that it was simple and practical while promising the maximum possible revenue. In contrast to this result, it is known that designing an optimal mechanism is much harder for the case of multiple items. There has been some efforts to find a revenue-optimal mechanism for selling two heterogeneous items [17] but, unfortunately so far too little is known about the problem even for this case, with more items.
Hardness of this problem is even more highlighted when Hart and Reny [13] observed randomization is necessary for the case of multiple items. This reveals the fact that even if we knew how to design an optimal mechanism for selling multiple items, it would be almost impossible to implement the optimal strategy in a real-world auction. Therefore, so far studies are focused on finding simple and approximately optimal mechanisms.
Speaking of simple mechanisms, it is very natural to think of selling items separately or as a whole bundle. The former mechanism is denoted by SRev and the latter is referred to by BRev. Hart and Nissan [12] show SRev mechanism achieves at least Ω(1/ log 2 n) of the optimal revenue in independent setting and BRev mechanism yields at least an Ω(1/ log n) approximation for the case of identically independent distributions. Later on, this result was improved by the work of Li and Yao, who obtained Ω(1/ log n) for SRev and a constant approximation for BRev for identically independent distributions [15] . These bounds are tight up to a constant factor. Moreover, it is shown BRev can be θ(n) times worse than the revenue of an optimal mechanism for independent setting. Therefore in order to achieve a constant-factor approximation mechanism we should think about more non-trivial strategies.
The seminal work of Babaioff et al. [3] shows despite the fact that both strategies SRev and BRev may separately result in a bad approximation factor, max{SRev, BRev} always has a revenue at least 1 7.5 of an optimal mechanism. They also show we can find out which of these strategies has more revenue in polynomial time which yields a deterministic simple mechanism that can be implemented in polynomial time. However, there has been no significant progress in designing simple and approximate mechanisms for the case of correlated items, as [3] leave it as an open problem.
Another line of research investigated optimal mechanism for selling n items to a single unit-demand buyer. Chawla et al. [10] show how complex the optimal strategies can become by proving that the gap between the revenue of deterministic mechanisms and revenue of non-determinstic mechanisms can be unbounded even when we have a constant number of correlated items. This highlights the fact that when it comes to general correlations, there is not much that can be achieved by deterministic mechanisms. However, Chawla et al. [10] study the problem with a mild correlation known as the common base-value correlation and present positive results for deterministic mechanisms in this case.
Results and Techniques
We study the mechanism design for selling n items to buyers with additive valuation function when desirabilities of each buyer for items are correlated. The main result of the paper is that max{SRev, BRev} achieves a constant approximation of the optimal revenue when we have only one buyer and the distribution of valuations for this buyer is a common base-value distribution. This problem was left open in [3] .
Theorem 3.1 For an auction with one seller, one buyer, and common base-value distribution of valuations we have
Furthurmore, we generalize this result by considering linear correlations and proving that the same mechanism gaurantees at least 1 7.5k of the optimal revenue when we have ony one buyer and the correlation between items is a linear correlation in which value of each item depends on the value of at most k features.
Theorem 3.2 Let D be a distribution of valuation for one buyer in an auction such that the correlation between items is linear. If each row of M 1 has at most k non-zero entries, then we have
Our approach for both problems is as follows. First we show max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} ≥ Rev(D)
for a semi-independent distribution D. This is achieved by applying the core decomposition lemma and setting proper values for t i 's. Next, we analyze the behaviour of max{SRev, BRev} in each of the settings by creating another auction in which each item of the original auction is split into several items and the distributions are semi-independent. We show that the optimal revenue in the second auction is no less than the optimal revenue of the first auction and also selling all items together gets the same revenue in both auctions. Finally, we bound the revenue of SRev in the original auction by a fraction of SRev of the new auction and putting all inequalities together we show max{SRev, BRev} is at least a fraction of Rev.
We also introduce a new mechanism for pricing items which we call point mechanism . In this mechanism we set a price for each item. We only add one more constraint which does not allow the buyers to pay less than a set price l. In other words, if a buyer wants to buy some items, the price that he is paying for all items should be at least l, otherwise the seller does not sell anything to him. Unlike the other mechanism that we consider in this paper, in this mechanism pricing of items is not based on Myerson's optimal mechanism. We show in the case of many buyers with i.i.d. distribution of desirabiliteis, PPRev (the optimal revenue that we can achieve using point mechanism) is at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue we can achieve by partition mechanism. Next, we give an example in which point mechanism achieves a revenue Ω(log n) times more than what partition mechanism can possible obtain. Theorem 3.3 Let PRev(D) be the revenue of the optimal partition mechanism for n items with i.i.d.. distributions and m buyers. There is a point mechanism with revenue PPRev(D) ≥ 1 32 PRev(D). Proposition 3.1 There exists a setting with n items with i.i.d. distributions and m buyers such that PRev ≤ PPRev/Ω(log n).
Perliminiaries
Throughout this paper we study the optimal mechanisms for selling n items to m risk-neutral, quasilinear buyers. The items are considered to be indivisible and not necessarily identical i.e. buyers can have different distributions of desirabilities for different items. In our setting, distributions are denoted by
. . , v i,n which is randomly drawn from D i specifying the values he has for the items. Note that, vectors of desirabilities are drawn independently for buyers, but values within each vector may be correlated. Once a mechanism is set for selling items, each buyer purchases a set S V i of the items that maximizes
is the desirability of S V i for that buyer and p i (S V i ) is the price that he pays. The revenue achieved by a mechanism is equal to
The following terminology is used in [3] in order to compare the performance of different mechanisms. In this paper we use similar notations and introduce a new mechanism which we call point mechanism with maximal revenue PPRev(D) as follows.
• Rev(D): Maximum possible revenue that can be achieved by any truthful machanism.
• SRev(D): The revenue that we get when selling items separately using Myerson's optimal mechanism for selling a single item.
• BRev(D): The revenue that we get when selling all items as a whole package using Myerson's optimal mechanism for selling a single item.
• PRev(D): The maximum possible revenue that we get by partitioning items into some packages and selling each package as a single item using Myerson's optimal mechanism.
• PPRev(D): The maximum possible revenue that we get by pricing items separately (not necessarily with Myerson's mechanism), and setting a minimum purchase value l which specifies that a buyer can buy a set S of items if he pays max{l, p(S)} where p(S) is the total price of items in the set.
We say an n-dimensional distribution D i of the desirabilities of a buyer is independent over the items if
Furthermore, we define the semi-independent distributions as follows.
Definition 4.1 Let D i be a distribution of valuations of a buyer over a set of items. We say D is semiindependent iff the valuations of every two different items are either always equal or completely independent. Moreover, we say two items a and b are similar in a semi-independent distribution
Moreover, we define the common-base value distributions as follows.
A natural generalization of common-base distributions are distributions in which the valuation of each item is determined by a linear combination of k independent variables which are the same for all items. More precisely, we define the linear distribution in the following way. 
The core decomposition technique
Most of the results in this area are mainly achieved by the core decomposition technique which was first introduced in [15] . Using this technique we can bound the revenue of an optimal mechanism without having any information about its behaviour. The underlying idea is to split distributions into two parts: the core and the tail. If we were to know in advance for which items the valuations in the core part will be and for which items the valuations in the tail part will be, we would achieve the optimal revenue without any additional information. This gives us an intuition which we can bound the optimal revenue by bounding the total sum of 2 n mechanims where in each mechanism we know each valuation is in which part. Then the tricky part would be to separate the items whose valuations are in the core from the items whose valuations are in the tail in each mechanism and then sum them up separately. We use the same notation which was used in [3] for formalizing our arguments as follows.
• r i : The revenue that we get by selling item i using Mayerson' auction.
• r: The revenue we get by using strategy SRev which is equal to r i .
• t i : A real number specifying the core and the tail for the distribution of item i. we say a valuation v i is in the core if 0 ≤ v i ≤ r i t i and is in the tail otherwise.
• p i : This is a real number equal to the probability that max{v 1,1 , v 2,1 , . . . , v m,1 } > r i t i .
• p A (A is a subset of items): A real numebr equal to the probability that ∀i /
The distribution of desirabilities of the buyers for item i.
• D (A) (A is a subset of items): The distribution of desirabilities of the buyers for items in A.
• D C i : A distribution of valuations of the i-th item for all buyers that is equal to D (i) conditioned on
• D T i : A distribution of valuations of the i-th item for all buyers that is equal to D (i) conditioned on
• D A : A distribution of valuations for all items and all buyers which is equal to D conditioned on both
In Lemma 5.2 we provide an upper bound for p i . Next we bound Rev(D C i ) and Rev(D) in Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 and at last in Lemma 5.6 which is known as Core Decomposition Lemma we prove an upper bound for Rev(D). All these lemmas are proved in [3] for the case of independent setting. For all these lemmas we give similar proofs that work in the correlated setting as well. For brevity we omit the proofs and include them in the appendix. ).
For independent setting we can apply Lemma 5.1 to Lemma 5.5 and finally with help of some algebraic inequalities come up with the following inequality
Unfortunately this does not hold for correlated setting since in Lemma 5.1 we assume valuation of items of A are independent of the items of [N ] − A. Therefore, we need to slightly modify this lemma such that it becomes applicable to the correlated settings as well. Thus, we add the following restriction to the valuation of items: For each A such that p A is non-zero, the valuation of items in A are independent of items of [N ] − A.
Lemma 5.6
If for every A with p A > 0 the values of items in A are drawn independent of the items in
Proof: According to Lemma 5.5 we have
Since for every A such that p A > 0 we know the values of items in A are drawn independent of items in [N ] − A, we can apply Lemma 5.1 to Inequality (5.1) to come up with the following inequality.
Note that, D C ∅ is an upper bound for Val(D C A ) for all A. Therefore
We rewrite the inequality to separate
Semi-Independent distributions
In this section we give a deterministic mechanism for selling n items to one buyer in the semi-independent setting. To do so, we first show k · SRev(D) ≥ Rev(D) where we have n items divided into k types such that items of each type are similar. Next we use this lemma in order to prove max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} achieves a constant-factor approximation of the revenue of an optimal mechanism. To prove this, we use the following lemma which is proved in [16] .
Lemma 6.1
In an auction with one seller, one buyer, and multiple similar items we have Rev(D) = SRev(D).
We also need Lemma 6.2 proved in [12] and [3] which bounds the revenue when we have a sub-domain S two independent value distributions D and D ′ over disjoint sets of items. 
Lemma 6.3
In a single-seller mechanism with m buyers and n items in which there are k types of items we have Rev(D) ≤ mk · SRev(D).
Proof: First we prove the case m = 1. The proof is by induction on k. For k = 1, all items are identical and by Lemma 6.1 Rev(D) = SRev(D). Now we prove the case in which we have k non-similar types assuming the theorem holds for k − 1. Consider a partition of D into two parts S 1 and S 2 where in S 1 , v 1 c 1 ≥ c i v i for each i and in S 2 there is at least one type i such that c i v i > c 1 v 1 . Let D 1 and D 2 denote the valuations conditioned on S 1 and S 2 , respectively, and let p 1 and p 2 denote the probability that the valuations lie in D 1 and D 2 . Since we do not lose revenue due to having extra information about the domain
Thus we need to bound p 1 Rev(D 1 ) and p 2 Rev(D 2 ). Let D −i denote the distribution of valuations excluding the items of type i. Using Lemma 6.2,
. Hence by Inequality (6.1),
Now the goal is to bound four terms in Inequality (6.2). For the first term consider the following truthful mechanism. Assume we only want to sell the items of type one. We take a sample v ∼ D and then sell all c 1 items of type one in a bundle with price max 2≤i≤k {c i v i }. With probability p 1 , c 1 v 1 ≥ max 2≤i≤k {c i v i } and hence the bundle would be sold. Thus with probability p 1 , valuations lie in D 1 which means for each i v 1 c 1 ≥ c i v i and the revenue we get is c 1 v 1 , therefore
For the third term we provide another truthful mechanism which can sell all items except the items of type one. Take a sample v ∼ D, put all items of the same type in the same bundles, except the items of type one. Hence we have k − 1 bundles. Price all bundles equal to c 1 v 1 . With probability p 2 at least one bundle has valuation more than c 1 v 1 and as a result would be sold and the revenue is more than Val(D 2 1 ). Moreover by Lemma 6.1 in each bundle the maximum revenue is achieved by selling the items separately, thus
Moreover by induction hypothesis,
Rev(D −1 ) ≤ kSRev(D −1 )). , BRev(D)} achieves a constant approximation factor of the optimal revenue mechanism in independetn setting. [3] . In this proof, we first apply the core decomposition lemma with t i = 2r/(r i n i ) and break down the problem into two sub-problems. In the first sub-problem we show A p A Rev(D T A ) ≤ 3 √ e 2 SRev(D) and in the second sub-problem we prove 5 max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} ≥ Val(D C ∅ ). Having these two bounds together, we can apply the core decomposition lemma to imply max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} ≥ 1 7.5 · Rev(D). Lemma 6.4 Let D be a semi-independent distrubation of valuations for n items in single buyer setting. In this problem we have max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} ≥ 1 7.5 · Rev(D).
Proof:
We use the core decomposition technique to prove this lemma. Let n i be the number of items that are equal to item i. We set t i = 2r/(r i n i ) and then apply the Core Decomposition Lemma to prove a lower bound for max{SRev(D), BRev(D)}. According to this lemma we have
To prove the theorem, we first show
Proposition 6.1 If we set t i = 2r/(r i n i ) the following inequality holds in the single buyer setting.
where D is a semi-independent valuation function for n items.
Proof: According to Lemma 6.4 we have
Therefore, the following inequality holds.
where d A is the number of non-similar items in A. By rewriting Equation (6.8) we get
In the next step we will show
Since for every two equal items i and j, r i and n i are equal to r j and n j , t i is also equal to t j and thus p A = 0 if i ∈ A but j / ∈ A. Therefore, we can assume that for every A such that p A > 0, every set of equal items is either a subset of A or completely disjoint from A. Therefore, we can consider each set of equal items as a package containing all the items in the set. Let S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s |S| } be a maximal set of equal items and p S be the probability that all items of S lie in the tail (which is equal to r/r sa n sa for all 1 ≤ a ≤ |S|). Now we can formulate p A as
and thus
where S * is the package containing item i and all S a 's are different packages of items other than S * . By rewriting Equation (6.12) we have
Since t i = 1/p i we have:
By applying Inequality (6.14) to Inequality (6.9) we have
Next, we use the Proposition 6.2 to bound n j=1 j 2 1−j (j−1)! . For simplicity we give the proof of this proposition in the appendix. Proposition 6.2 For every n > 1 we have
Proposition 6.2 states that n j=1 j 2 1−j (j−1)! is at most 3 √ e 2 and hence
Next, we show that max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} is at least Val(D C ∅ ) which completes the proof. In the proof of this proposition, we use the following Lemma which has been proved by Li and Yao in [15] . where t i = 2r/(r i n i ).
Since SRev(D) = r, the proof is trivial when Val(D C ∅ ) ≤ 5r. Therefore, we assume Val(D C ∅ ) > 5r from now on. Next, we show that Var(D C ∅ ) ≤ 4r 2 and then use this fact in order to show BRev(D) is a constant approxmiation of Rev(D C ∅ ). To do so, we formulate the variance of D C ∅ as follows:
if items i and j are equal and 0 otherwise. Therefore,
Var(D C i ) × n i (6.17)
Recall that Lemma 6.5 states that Var(D C i ) ≤ 4rr i /n i , and thus
Since Val(D C ∅ ) ≥ 5r and Var(D C ∅ ) ≤ 4r 2 , we can apply the Chebyshev's Inequality to show
Common Base-Value Distributions
In this section we study the same problem with common base-value distributions. Recall that in these distributions disariblities of buyers are of the form v i,j = f i,j + b i where f i,j is drawn from a known distribution F i,j and b i is the same for all items and is drawn from a known distribution B i . Again, we show max SRev, BRev achives a constant approximation of the revenue optimal mechanism when we have only one buyer. Note that, this result answers an open question raised by Babaioff et al. in [3] . Proof: Let I be an instance of the problem. We create an instance Cor(I) of the problem with 2n items such that the distribution of valuations is a semi-independent distribution D ′ as where D ′ i = F i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and D ′ i = B for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n. Moreover, the valuations of the items n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n are always equal and all other valuations are independent. Thus, by the defintion, D ′ is a semi-independent distribution of valuations and by Lemma 6.4 we have
Since every mechanism for selling the items of D can be mapped to a mechanisem for selling the items of D ′ where items i and n + i are considered as a single package containing both items, we have
Moreover, since in the bundle mechanism we sell all of the items as a whole bundel, the revenue achieved by mechanism BRev is the same in both auctions. Hence,
Note that, we can consider SRev(D) as a mechanism for selling items of Cor(I) such that items are packed into partitions of size 2 (items i is packed with item n + i) and each partition is priced with Myerson's optimal mechanism. Since for every two independent distributions
According to Inequalities 7.1,7.2, and 7.3 we have
Linear Correlation
A natural generalization of common base-value distributions is an extended correlation such that the valuation of each item for a buyer can be a linear combination of his desirabilities for some features where the distribution of desirabilities for features are independent and known. More precisely, let F i,1 , F i,2 , . . . , F i,l be l independent distributions of disarabilities of features for buyer i and once each value f i,j is drawn from F i,j , desirability of the i-buyer for j-th item is determined by
. . , f i,l and M i is an n × l matrix containing non-negative values.
Note that, a semi-independent distribution of valuations is a special case of linear correlation where we have n + 1 features F i,1 , F i,2 , . . . , F i,n+1 and M i is a matrix such that (M i ) a,b = 1 if either a = b or b = n + 1 and (M i ) a,b = 0 otherwise. In this case, F i,n+1 is the base value which is shared between all items and each of the other distributions is dedicated to a single item.
In this section we show that if we have only one buyer and the distribution of his desirabilities for items has a linear correlation and M 1 has at most k none-zero elements in each row then max{SRev, BRev} achieves at least 1 7.5k of the revenue of the revenue optimal mechanism. This result generalizes the approximation result for common-base value distributions since each common-base value distribution is a special case of linear correlation where M i has at most two non-zero entries in each row.
Theorem 8.1 Let D be a distribution of valuation for one buyer in an auction such that the correlation between items is linear. If each row of M 1 has at most k non-zero entries, then we have
× Rev(D).
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.1. Since we can multiply the entries of the matrix by any integer number and divide the values of distribution by that number without any impact on the setting of the problem, for the sake of simplicity, we assume all values of M 1 are integers. Let I be an instance of our auction. We create an instance Cor(I) of an auction with semi-independent distributions as follows. Let n i be the total sum of numbers in i-th column of M 1 . For each feature we put a set of items in Cor(I) containing n i similar elements. Moreover, we consider every two items of different types to be independent. We refer to the distribution of items in Cor(I) with D ′ . Each strategy of auction I can be mapped to a strategy of auction Cor(I) by just partitioning items of Cor(I) into some packages, such that package i has (M 1 ) i,a items from a-th type, and then treating each package as a single item. Therefore we have
Moreover, bundle strategy has the same revenue in both auction since it sells all items as a whole package. Therefore the following equality holds.
Now, all that remains is to find a lower bound in terms of SRev(D ′ ) for SRev(D). Recall that each row of M 1 has at most k non-zero entries which implies that the corresponding strategy of SRev(D) in Cor(I) has at most k non-similar items and hence 
Point mechanism
In this section we introduce a new simple mechanism which we call point mechanism. We show that in i.i.d. distributions the revenue obtained by point mechanism PPRev ∈ O(PRev) and provide a lower bound PRev ≤ PPRev/Ω(log n).
In point mechanism we use the simple item pricing mechanism where each item has a separate price. The only difference is that buyers enter the mechanism sequentially and each buyer needs to pay at least a minimum payment amount M in order to buy her desired items. More precisely if the buyer is interested in buying a set of items S, then she will be able to buy the set iff she pays max{M, i∈S π i }, where π i is the price of i-th item. Note that point mechanism is more general than both item pricing and bundle pricing. By M = 0, we have a mechanism equivalent to item pricing, and by M = π i , we have a mechanism equivalent to bundle pricing. Babaioff et al. [3] prove in a mechanism with a single additive buyer max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} ≥ 1 6 Rev(D), thus by the aforementioned reductions for single additive buyer we have PPRev(D) ≥ 1 6
Rev(D).
However in multi-buyer mechanisms both max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} might be less than the optimal revenue by a factor of log n. Moreover [3] proves the revenue of any partition pricing might be less than the optimal revenue by a factor of log n. In the following we prove the revenue by point mechanism PPRev(D) is no less than a constant fraction of the revenue by partition pricing and also PPRev(D) might be greater than PRev(D) by a log n factor. First we should prove some characteristics of the partition mechanisms. Lemma 9.1 Let PRev(D) be the revenue of the optimal partition mechanism for n items with i.i.d. distributions and m buyers. There is a partition mechanism with revenue PRev * (D) such that the size and price of each part is the same and PRev * (D) ≥ 1 2 PRev(D).
Proof: Since the distributions are assumed i.i.d. each partition mechanism is identified by the size and prices of the parts. Let the optimal partition mechanism partition the items into k parts. Let s i and π i denote the size and price of the i-th part respectively. Let e i be the expected revenue from the i-th part, i.e., e i = Pr[i-th part is sold] × π i . We can write the revenue as
Now let ρ i denote the ratio of the expected revenue of the i-th part to the size of the i-th part, i.e., ρ i = e i s i . Thus one can rewrite Equality (9.1) as
Let j-th part be the part with the maximum ratio. More formally j = arg max 1≤i≤k {ρ i }. We claim that if we design a new partition mechanism which has only parts of size s j and for all of them the price is π j , the revenue would be at least half of the optimal partition revenue. Note that n is not necessarily dividable by s j but at least half of the items would be in the parts. Let PRev * denote the revenue for the new partition mechanism. We write Inequality Now we can prove there is a point mechanism that obtains a constant fraction of the partition revenue.
Theorem 9.1 Let PRev(D) be the revenue of the optimal partition mechanism for n items with i.i.d. distributions and m buyers. There is a point mechanism with revenue PPRev(D) ≥ 1 c PRev(D), where c is a constant.
